Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311227 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Environmental and Resource Economics [ISSN:] 1573-1502 [Volume:] 82 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer Netherlands [Place:] Dordrecht [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 601-624
Publisher: 
Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the stability of international environmental agreements in a dynamic game when the generation of both renewables and fossil fuel based energy requires specialized capital stocks or technologies, respectively. Two contract types are considered. At an incomplete (a complete) contract, the coalition coordinates only (both) CO 2emissions (and renewable energy investments) of its members. In contrast to the results of Battaglini and Harstad (J Polit Econ 124:160–204, 2016) who endorse incomplete contracts to increase the coalition size, only small coalitions are stable regardless of whether the contract is complete or incomplete. This result also holds if black technology is temporary not completely used or transfers are considered.
Subjects: 
International environmental agreements
Black capacity
Complete contract
Incomplete contract
JEL: 
H87
Q54
Q55
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.