Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/311108 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 2959
Publisher: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Abstract: 
In the aftermath of the European sovereign debt crisis, the question of who should bear the burden of banking crises has been a cornerstone of the new supervisory framework in Europe. We evaluate the bail-in regulation (BRRD) for bank bond holdings using a proprietary database covering holdings of all euro-denominated securities. We focus on hard-to-value bailinable bank bonds and show that banks increased their holdings of bailinable bank bonds while households and non-financial corporations reduced their holdings of bailinable bonds issued by riskier banks.
Subjects: 
Bail-in
Bond holdings
Bond allocation
JEL: 
G21
G28
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-92-899-6769-3
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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