Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/309976 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
Cardiff Economics Working Papers No. E2024/26
Publisher: 
Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff
Abstract: 
When faced with budget-constrained bidders, all-pay auctions revenue-dominate standard auctions (Örst and second-price), which, in a competitive market, gives an edge to the all-pay format. An equilibrium in which sellers compete with standard auctions fails to exist if the all-pay format is available. Assuming the budget is not severely limited, in the unique symmetric equilibrium sellers compete with all-pay auctions.
Subjects: 
All-pay Auctions
Budget Constraints
Directed Search
Competing Auctions
JEL: 
D4
D81
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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