Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/309468 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] The Journal of Industrial Economics [ISSN:] 1467-6451 [Volume:] 72 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 729-761
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
We explain why a manufacturer may impose a minimum resale price in a successive monopoly setting. Our argument relies on the retailer having noncontractible choice variables such as the price of a substitute good and/or the retailer's service effort. Our explanation for minimum resale prices is empirically distinguishable from alternative justifications that rely, for instance, on retailer competition and service free riding among retailers. Whether a min RPM benefits or harms consumers depends on its effects: if it softens competition with the substitute product, it tends to harm consumers, and if it secures service provision, it tends to benefit consumers.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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