Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/309166 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
EGC Discussion Papers No. 1110
Publisher: 
Yale University, Economic Growth Center, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
We partner with Ecuador's government to implement a centralized school choice system using a Deferred Acceptance algorithm in Manta. Our study evaluates the welfare impact of transitioning from a distance-based assignment system to one that incorporates families' preferences. Results show that accounting for preferences yields substantial welfare gains. Counterfactual analyses suggest that alternative mechanisms offer limited improvements compared to the benefits of preference inclusion and coordinated assignments. Household survey data on beliefs and satisfaction support these findings, indicating that centralized school choice systems can deliver significant welfare effects in developing countries.
Subjects: 
Market Design
centralized student assignment
school choice
Ecuador
JEL: 
I20
I21
I22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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