Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/309166 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
EGC Discussion Papers No. 1110
Verlag: 
Yale University, Economic Growth Center, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
We partner with Ecuador's government to implement a centralized school choice system using a Deferred Acceptance algorithm in Manta. Our study evaluates the welfare impact of transitioning from a distance-based assignment system to one that incorporates families' preferences. Results show that accounting for preferences yields substantial welfare gains. Counterfactual analyses suggest that alternative mechanisms offer limited improvements compared to the benefits of preference inclusion and coordinated assignments. Household survey data on beliefs and satisfaction support these findings, indicating that centralized school choice systems can deliver significant welfare effects in developing countries.
Schlagwörter: 
Market Design
centralized student assignment
school choice
Ecuador
JEL: 
I20
I21
I22
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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