Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/308754 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 2415
Publisher: 
Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics, Linz
Abstract: 
Using linked vacancy-employer-employee data from Austria, we investigate how monopsony power affects firms' posting behavior and wage negotiations. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that firms with greater monopsony power post lower wages and offer fewer non-wage amenities, suggesting that wages and non-wage benefits are complementary. However, we find no evidence that monopsonistic firms demand higher levels of skill or education. Instead, our results indicate that they require more basic skills, particularly those related to routine tasks. On the workers' side, we find that employees hired in monopsonistic labor markets face significantly lower wages, both initially and in the long-run. These lower wages are driven by both lower posted wages and reduced bargaining power, as well as reduced opportunities to climb the wage ladder later.
Subjects: 
Monopson
wage
collective bargaining
job profile
Austria
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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