Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/308251 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Wirtschaftsdienst [ISSN:] 1613-978X [Volume:] 104 [Issue:] 11 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 794-799
Publisher: 
Sciendo, Warsaw
Abstract: 
The Federal Network Agency plans to extend the frequency usage rights of the established mobile network operators until 2030, combined with a negotiation requirement for 1&1's access to frequencies below 1 GHz. This analysis identifies key weaknesses of the negotiation bid: lack of clarity regarding regulatory intervention in the event of a non-agreement, inefficient last-minute effects, asymmetric negotiating power and problems with the disclosure of sensitive information. As an alternative, a structured auction procedure is proposed that includes product definition by 1&1, an explicit maximum price and a "descending clock auction" to enable a more efficient and transparent award process.
JEL: 
D44
D47
L96
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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