Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30817
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dc.contributor.authorHeuson, Clemensen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-07-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:40:48Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:40:48Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30817-
dc.description.abstractIt is well known that uncertainty concerning firms' costs as well as market power of the latter have to be taken into account in order to design and choose environmental policy instruments in an optimal way. As a matter of fact, in the most actual environmental regulation settings the policy maker has to face both of these complications simultaneously. However, hitherto environmental economic theory has restricted itself to either of them when submitting conventional policy instruments to a comparative analysis. The article at hand accounts for closing this gap by investigating the welfare effects of emission standards and taxes against the background of uncertain emission control costs and a polluting asymmetric Cournot duopoly.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv., Inst. für Volkswirtschaftslehre|cAugsburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aVolkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsreihe // Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Augsburg|x300en_US
dc.subject.jelD62en_US
dc.subject.jelD89en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelQ58en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordAsymmetric Cournot duopolyen_US
dc.subject.keywordexternal diseconomies of pollutionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcost uncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.keywordemission standarden_US
dc.subject.keywordemission taxen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwEntscheidung bei Unsicherheiten_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltauflageen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltabgabeen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkosteueren_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltbehördeen_US
dc.subject.stwKostenen_US
dc.subject.stwDuopolen_US
dc.subject.stwExterner Effekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleEmission standards vs. taxes: the case of asymmetric Cournot duopoly and uncertain control costsen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn571455034en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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