Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/308018 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society [ISSN:] 1468-232X [Issue:] Early View [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1-29
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
In 2013, mandatory worker representation on French corporate boards was enacted. We examine the way employee directors have been incorporated within the board machinery. Our empirical results indicate that employee representatives have a limited access to board committees. This result casts doubt on the ability of employee directors to significantly influence corporate governance. Consistent with this analysis, we do not find any significant impact, either positive or negative, of codetermination on firm performance.
Subjects: 
codetermination
employee directors
industrial relations
corporate governance
board committees
JEL: 
G3
J5
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version
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