Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/307979 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ifo Working Paper No. 414
Verlag: 
ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
During the energy crisis in 2022, electricity prices in Germany soared to unprecedented levels. To explore the drivers of the high electricity prices, we develop an electricity dispatch model that simulates hourly equilibrium prices under the assumption of perfect competition. We then extend this model to account for firms exercising market power. By comparing the outcomes of the perfect competition and Cournot competition models with actual market data, we demonstrate that market power may contributed to higher prices during the crisis, elevating them beyond what rising input costs alone would justify.
Schlagwörter: 
Energy Economics
Market Power
Energy Crisis
Electricity Prices
Cournot Competition
JEL: 
Q41
Q43
L13
D43
L94
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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