Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/307621 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Quantitative Marketing and Economics [ISSN:] 1573-711X [Volume:] 21 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 381-435
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
We consider a vertically differentiated market where an incumbent strategically wants to launch a fighter brand to thwart a new entrant. Without a credibly commitment this launch is ineffective because the incumbent always has an incentive to price the fighter brand ex-post out of the market. Endogenous price leadership with fixed or list price announcement, and dual channeling with an intermediary retailer to distribute the fighter brand are analyzed as commitment devices. The optimal mode then depends on customers' sensitivities to a deviation from the price announcement as well as on the attractiveness of the underlying market.
Subjects: 
Fighter brand
Endogenous price leadership
Dual channeling
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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