Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30753
Authors: 
Bauernschuster, Stefan
Falck, Oliver
Große, Niels Daniel
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 2923
Abstract: 
This paper investigates how group membership and competition among trustors interact with trust and trustworthiness in a laboratory one-shot trust game. To analyze these effects, we apply a 2x2 design. We induce group membership by letting subjects play coordination games with clear focal points, leading to higher investments and trustworthiness. Introducing competition leads to a decrease in trustworthiness, especially among partners. We argue that once competition comes into play, trustees perceive trustors' investments as the outcomes of a competitive bidding process rather than good intentions, which reduces reciprocity.
Subjects: 
trust
reciprocity
investment game
group membership
competition
JEL: 
C92
G11
Z13
L14
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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