Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30744 
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dc.contributor.authorKrasa, Stefanen
dc.contributor.authorPolborn, Mattiasen
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-03-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:26:43Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:26:43Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30744-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a formal model in which the government provides public goods in different policy fields for its citizens. We start from the basic premise that two office-motivated candidates have differential capabilities in different policy fields, and compete by proposing how to allocate government resources to those fields. The model has a unique equilibrium that differs substantially from the standard median-voter model. While candidates compete for the support of a moderate voter type, this cutoff voter differs from the expected median voter. Moreover, no voter type except the cutoff voter is indifferent between the candidates in equilibrium. The model also predicts that candidates respond to changes in the preferences of voters in a very rigid way. We also analyze under which conditions candidates choose to strengthen the issue in which they have a competence advantage, and when they rather compensate for their weakness.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2930en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordissue ownershipen
dc.subject.keyworddifferentiated candidatesen
dc.subject.keywordpolicy divergenceen
dc.subject.stwÖkonomische Theorie der Demokratieen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwWahlkampfen
dc.subject.stwSachverständigeen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleCompetition between specialized candidates-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn620100354en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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