Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30740 
Full metadata record
Appears in Collections:
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGersbach, Hansen
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-03-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:26:40Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:26:40Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30740-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we examine the potential of democratic constitutions for the provision of divisible public goods in a large economy. Our main insights are as follows: When aggregate shocks are absent, the combination of the following rules yields first-best allocations: a supermajority rule, equal taxation, exemption of the agenda setter from taxation, and a ban on subsidies. In the presence of aggregate shocks to benefits or to costs of public-good provision, tax-sensitive majority rules, where the size of the required majority depends on the aggregate tax revenues, yield first-best allocations if a monotonicity condition is met. Finally, we explore the potential of first-best constitutions to induce voluntary participation by compensating agents belonging to the minority.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2939en
dc.subject.jelD62en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelH40en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keyworddemocratic constitutionsen
dc.subject.keywordtax-sensitive majority rulesen
dc.subject.keywordconstitutional rulesen
dc.subject.keywordprovision of public goodsen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwVersorgungen
dc.subject.stwDemokratieen
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungsregelen
dc.subject.stwSteuerpolitiken
dc.subject.stwVerfassungsökonomiken
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleDemocratic provision of divisible public goods-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn62011830Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
292.67 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.