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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11407
Verlag: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper examines the integration of ESG performance metrics into executive compensation using a detailed panel dataset of European executives. Despite becoming more widespread, most ESG metrics are largely discretionary, carry immaterial weights in payout calculations, and contribute little to executive pay risk. Such ESG metrics with arguably weak incentive power are common in financial firms and large companies, particularly for their most visible executives, which seems consistent with greenwashing. In contrast, binding ESG metrics with significant weights, which have potential to influence incentives, are only found in sectors with a large environmental footprint.
Schlagwörter: 
executive compensation
ESG
ESG metrics
ESG contracting
CSR contracting
sustainability
incentive contracting
optimal contracts
JEL: 
G30
G35
J33
M12
M52
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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