Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30724 
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dc.contributor.authorStrausz, Rolanden
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-05-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:26:29Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:26:29Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30724-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates political uncertainty as a source of regulatory risk. It shows that political parties have incentives to reduce regulatory risk actively: Mutually beneficial pre-electoral agreements that reduce regulatory risk always exist. Agreements that fully eliminate it exist when political divergence is small or electoral uncertainty is appropriately skewed. These results follow from a fluctuation effect of regulatory risk that hurts parties and an output-expansion effect that benefits at most one party. Due to commitment problems, regulatory agencies with some degree of political independence are needed to implement pre-electoral agreements.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2953en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordregulationen
dc.subject.keywordregulatory risken
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen
dc.subject.keywordelectoral uncertaintyen
dc.subject.keywordindependent regulatory agencyen
dc.subject.stwRegulierungen
dc.subject.stwPolitische Entscheidungen
dc.subject.stwRisikoen
dc.subject.stwAufsichtsbehördeen
dc.subject.stwSelbstverwaltungen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe political economy of regulatory risk-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn620398914en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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