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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30724
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Strausz, Roland | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-03-05 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-14T08:26:29Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-05-14T08:26:29Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30724 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper investigates political uncertainty as a source of regulatory risk. It shows that political parties have incentives to reduce regulatory risk actively: Mutually beneficial pre-electoral agreements that reduce regulatory risk always exist. Agreements that fully eliminate it exist when political divergence is small or electoral uncertainty is appropriately skewed. These results follow from a fluctuation effect of regulatory risk that hurts parties and an output-expansion effect that benefits at most one party. Due to commitment problems, regulatory agencies with some degree of political independence are needed to implement pre-electoral agreements. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x2953 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | regulation | en |
dc.subject.keyword | regulatory risk | en |
dc.subject.keyword | political economy | en |
dc.subject.keyword | electoral uncertainty | en |
dc.subject.keyword | independent regulatory agency | en |
dc.subject.stw | Regulierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Politische Entscheidung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Risiko | en |
dc.subject.stw | Aufsichtsbehörde | en |
dc.subject.stw | Selbstverwaltung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Public Choice | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | The political economy of regulatory risk | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 620398914 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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