Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/307230 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 17406
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
When formal insurance is unavailable, mutual insurance among households can serve as an alternative. This paper analyzes a game between economic agents facing uncertainty and maximizing discounted utility without enforceable contracts or access to capital markets. While autarky is always a possible outcome, under high discount factors, a mutually beneficial trigger-strategy equilibrium can be achieved. Full insurance is possible with strongly negatively correlated endowments, while partial insurance is generally feasible. The analysis highlights environments wherein varying levels of insurance can emerge, with applications to real-world institutional contexts.
Schlagwörter: 
mutual insurance
risk sharing
group formation
JEL: 
C72
C73
D80
G20
O11
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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