Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/307091 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2023
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Journal of Risk and Uncertainty [ISSN:] 1573-0476 [Volume:] 67 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 137-161
Verlag: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
In a sequence of experiments, this study investigates how people evaluate others who make risky decisions on their behalf, and how such evaluations affect delegated risk-taking. A decision maker acts on behalf of a client who holds the decision maker accountable by way of a subjective evaluation after observing a risky decision's outcome. If evaluation is biased towards the outcome, it may have dysfunctional effects with respect to delegated risk-taking in that decision makers' risk choices are increasingly misaligned with their clients' risk preferences. We find evidence giving support to this conjecture. Across and within three experiments, we test for the effects of different types and degrees of accountability in that we manipulate the information available to clients as well as the consequences which evaluations have for decision makers. Evaluations are biased towards outcomes in all experiments. When evaluations affect decision maker's compensations, a stronger outcome bias in evaluations translates into risk-taking decisions being less frequently aligned with clients' risk preferences. In the same situation, giving clients the opportunity to make peer comparisons increases outcome bias. We further find that clients do not hold decision makers accountable for their risk choices when they cannot observe the risk-taking decision, but have to infer it from observing the outcome. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed.
Schlagwörter: 
Risk-taking
Accountability
Outcome bias
Subjective evaluation
Relative outcome information
JEL: 
D81
D91
G41
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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