Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30707
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dc.contributor.authorVogelsang, Ingoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-11en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:26:17Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:26:17Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30707-
dc.description.abstractBased on an idiosyncratic reading of the literature I propose intermediate (rather than tight or soft) regulation for balancing investment incentives with allocative efficiency and competition objectives. Intermediate regulation is compatible with incentive regulation and helps lengthening the regulatory commitment period necessary for incentives. However, such commitment for the whole time horizon of infrastructure or innovation investments is impossible. The compatibility of incentive regulation and efficient investment is thus in doubt. Incentive regulation for regular infrastructure investments therefore needs periodic updating based on rate-of-return regulation criteria. Innovative infrastructure investments may warrant regulatory holidays, which should be conditioned on strict criteria.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2964en_US
dc.subject.jelL50en_US
dc.subject.jelL90en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizregulierungen_US
dc.subject.stwInvestitionspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwInfrastrukturinvestitionen_US
dc.subject.stwInnovationen_US
dc.subject.stwAllokationseffizienzen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleIncentive regulation, investments and technological changeen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn620938668en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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