Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/306817 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 1196
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
This paper examines the role of domestic elections and political polarisation in shaping international environmental agreements and how electoral dynamics may explain the limited success of current climate cooperation. I focus on two key factors: the impact of domestic electoral pressure on international policy decisions and the mismatch between short election cycles and long-term treaty commitments. Using a 4-stage game modelling a bilateral environmental agreement, I analyse how incumbents strategically balance policy preferences with reelection prospects. Results show that while a green incumbent is often forced to temper their ambitions, a brown incumbent faces fewer electoral constraints, explaining why stringent policies are harder to achieve. Nonetheless, electoral pressure can moderate policies, producing outcomes more aligned with the preferences of the median voter. Finally, I discuss how political polarisation, particularly in two-party systems, adds complexity to international cooperation on global public goods.
Subjects: 
international climate policy
political economy
elections
political polarisation
environmental policy making
public goods
externalities
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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