Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30671
Authors: 
Feld, Lars P.
Schaltegger, Christoph A.
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 2691
Abstract: 
This paper explores the role of political stability on fiscal policy choices in a time-series analysis over 158 years on the Swiss federal level. We argue that the fiscal-commons problem of public finances is affected by the time-horizon of a finance minister. Arguably, the incentives for an incumbent to maintain a good reputation with sound policy decisions are stronger the longer the time-horizon of a respective term. In addition, a finance minister who succeeds to stay a long time in office normally enjoys a politically powerful position towards the parliament, the administration and the interest groups to influence policy decisions. In contrast, frequent government turnover weakens the position of the finance minister.
Subjects: 
political stability
fiscal policy
constitutional changes
JEL: 
H11
H50
H61
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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