Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30656
Authors: 
Riedl, Aleksandra
Rocha-Akis, Silvia
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 2669
Abstract: 
To what extent do countries' corporate income tax (CIT) rates attract foreign tax bases? What are the revenue implications of a unilateral tax reduction when tax bases are internationally mobile? These questions are explored using a panel of annual data from 17 OECD countries spanning the period 1982 to 2005. We find significant international fiscal externalities in the form of CIT-induced resource flows. The magnitude, however, indicates that the extent of international corporate tax base mobility is rather modest. Moreover, we find that, on average, a unilateral CIT reduction results in a less-than-proportional increase in the CIT base, thus reducing CIT revenues. The results are robust across a wide range of specifications and point to potential gains from international tax policy coordination.
Subjects: 
tax competition
corporate income tax base elasticity
instrumental variables
international fiscal externalities
Laffer curve
panel data estimation
JEL: 
H71
H77
H87
C23
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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