Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30641 
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dc.contributor.authorArce, Daniel G.en
dc.contributor.authorKovenock, Danen
dc.contributor.authorRoberson, Brianen
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-03-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:23:32Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:23:32Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30641-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we examine a model of terrorism which focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has the ability to utilize either or both suicide and conventional terrorism tactics. The terrorist organization's objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize suicide attacks when other modes of attack are available, and the optimal anti-terrorism measures.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2753en
dc.subject.jelC70en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordconflicten
dc.subject.keywordsuicide terrorismen
dc.subject.keywordweakest linken
dc.subject.keywordColonel Blottoen
dc.subject.stwPolitische Gewalten
dc.subject.stwPolicy-Mixen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleSuicide terrorism and the weakest link-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn608181757en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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