Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30636
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dc.contributor.authorKumru, Cagri Sedaen
dc.contributor.authorThanopoulos, Athanasios C.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-08-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:23:29Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:23:29Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30636-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes a fully funded social security system under the assumption that agents face temptation issues. Agents are required to save through individually managed Personal Security Accounts without, and with mandatory annuitization. When the analysis is restricted to CRRA preferences our results are congruent with the literature indicating that the complete elimination of social security is the reform scenario that maximizes welfare improvement. However, when self control preferences are introduced, and as the intensity of self control becomes progressively more severe the social security elimination scenario loses ground very rapidly. In fact, in the case of very severe temptation the elimination of social security becomes the least desirable alternative. Under the light of the above findings, any reform proposal regarding the social security system should consider departures from standard preferences to preference specifications suitable for dealing with preference reversals.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2778en
dc.subject.jelE60en
dc.subject.jelH55en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordfunded social securityen
dc.subject.keywordunfunded social securityen
dc.subject.keywordself-control preferencesen
dc.subject.stwSozialversicherungen
dc.subject.stwUmlageverfahrenen
dc.subject.stwSozialreformen
dc.subject.stwPräferenztheorieen
dc.subject.stwRisikoaversionen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleSocial security reform and temptation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn610181300en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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