Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30626 
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dc.contributor.authorHaavio, Markusen
dc.contributor.authorKotakorpi, Kaisa Ilonaen
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-29-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:23:22Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:23:22Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30626-
dc.description.abstractWe analyse the determination of taxes on harmful goods when consumers have self-control problems. We show that under reasonable assumptions, the socially optimal corrective tax exceeds the average distortion caused by self-control problems. Further, we analyse how individuals with self-control problems would vote on taxes on the consumption of harmful goods, and show that the equilibrium tax is typically below the socially optimal level. When the redistributive effects of sin taxes are taken into account, the difference between the social optimum and equilibrium is small at low levels of harm, but becomes more pronounced when consumption is more harmful.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2650en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.jelH30en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordexcise taxationen
dc.subject.keywordvotingen
dc.subject.keywordself-controlen
dc.subject.stwGenussmittelen
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen
dc.subject.stwKonsumentenverhaltenen
dc.subject.stwBeschränkte Rationalitäten
dc.subject.stwSoziale Wohlfahrtsfunktionen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe political economy of sin taxes-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn603336205en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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