Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30626
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dc.contributor.authorHaavio, Markusen_US
dc.contributor.authorKotakorpi, Kaisa Ilonaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:23:22Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:23:22Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30626-
dc.description.abstractWe analyse the determination of taxes on harmful goods when consumers have self-control problems. We show that under reasonable assumptions, the socially optimal corrective tax exceeds the average distortion caused by self-control problems. Further, we analyse how individuals with self-control problems would vote on taxes on the consumption of harmful goods, and show that the equilibrium tax is typically below the socially optimal level. When the redistributive effects of sin taxes are taken into account, the difference between the social optimum and equilibrium is small at low levels of harm, but becomes more pronounced when consumption is more harmful.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2650en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelH30en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordexcise taxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordvotingen_US
dc.subject.keywordself-controlen_US
dc.subject.stwGenussmittelen_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwKonsumentenverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwBeschränkte Rationalitäten_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Wohlfahrtsfunktionen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe political economy of sin taxesen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn603336205en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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