Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/306057 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment Journal [ISSN:] 1864-6042 [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 1 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 123-136
Verlag: 
De Gruyter, Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Central bank independence has been championed on the grounds that it avoids political business cycles, the time-inconsistency problem of discretionary monetary policy, and political conflicts. However, after the financial crisis, central banks have resorted to unconventional monetary policies and embraced additional tasks, making monetary authorities more exposed to political interference. This new reality has put into question the long-lasting consensus on the desirability of central bank independence. We add to this debate a new argument in support of that independence, namely, it internalizes the fiscal spillovers that arise in a monetary union, which is not a full fiscal union.
Schlagwörter: 
Central Bank design
fiscal policies
international fiscal spillovers
monetary union
JEL: 
E52
E58
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