Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/306043 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] The Journal of Industrial Economics [ISSN:] 1467-6451 [Volume:] 72 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1089-1113
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
We provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance (RPM). In a model with two manufacturers and two retailers, we show that RPM facilitates manufacturer collusion when retailers have alternatives to selling a manufacturer's product. Because of the alternatives, manufacturers can only ensure that retailers sell their products by leaving sufficient retail margins. This restricts the wholesale price level even when the manufacturers collude. RPM allows colluding manufacturers to establish higher prices.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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