Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/306043 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] The Journal of Industrial Economics [ISSN:] 1467-6451 [Volume:] 72 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1089-1113
Verlag: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance (RPM). In a model with two manufacturers and two retailers, we show that RPM facilitates manufacturer collusion when retailers have alternatives to selling a manufacturer's product. Because of the alternatives, manufacturers can only ensure that retailers sell their products by leaving sufficient retail margins. This restricts the wholesale price level even when the manufacturers collude. RPM allows colluding manufacturers to establish higher prices.
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Dokumentart: 
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Dokumentversion: 
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