Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30599 
Full metadata record
Appears in Collections:
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGarfinkel, Michelle R.en
dc.contributor.authorSkaperdas, Stergiosen
dc.contributor.authorSyropoulos, Constantinosen
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-30-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:23:04Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:23:04Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30599-
dc.description.abstractWe augment the canonical neoclassical model of trade to allow for interstate disputes over land, oil, water, or other resources. The costs of such disputes in terms of arming depend on the trade regime in place. Under either autarky or free trade, the larger country (in terms of factor endowments) need not to be more powerful. Yet, under free trade, there is a stronger tendency for arming incentives to be equalized and thus for a leveling of the playing field.” Depending on world prices, free trade can intensify arming incentives to such an extent that the additional security costs swamp the traditional gains from trade and thus render autarky more desirable for one or both rival states. Furthermore, contestation of resources can reverse a country's apparent comparative advantage relative to its comparative advantage in the absence of conflict. And, where such conflict is present, comparisons of autarkic prices to world prices could be inaccurate predictors of trade patterns.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2680en
dc.subject.jelD30en
dc.subject.jelD70en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.jelF2en
dc.subject.jelF10en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordtrade opennessen
dc.subject.keywordproperty rightsen
dc.subject.keywordinterstate disputesen
dc.subject.keywordconflicten
dc.subject.keywordsecurity policiesen
dc.subject.stwAußenwirtschaftstheorieen
dc.subject.stwPolitischer Konflikten
dc.subject.stwGeopolitiken
dc.subject.stwSicherheitspolitiken
dc.subject.stwFreihandelen
dc.subject.stwAutarkieen
dc.subject.stwKomparativer Kostenvorteilen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleInternational trade and transnational insecurity : how comparative advantage and power are jointly determined-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn603421814en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.