Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30598
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dc.contributor.authorDjajić, Slobodanen_US
dc.contributor.authorMichael, Michael S.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:23:03Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:23:03Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30598-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the interaction between migration policies of the host and source countries in the context of a model of guest-worker migration. For the host, the objective is to provide low-cost labor for its employers while avoiding illegal immigration. It optimizes over these objectives by setting the time limit of a guest-worker permit. The source country seeks remittance flows and return migration by offering fiscal benefits to returnees. Within this framework, we solve for the Nash equilibrium values of the migration policy instruments and compare them with the ones that emerge in a cooperative setting.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2811en_US
dc.subject.jelF22en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordtemporary migrationen_US
dc.subject.keywordremittancesen_US
dc.subject.keywordmigration policyen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale Arbeitsmobilitäten_US
dc.subject.stwSaisonarbeitskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwMigrationspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleTemporary migration policies and welfare of the host and source countries : a game-theoretic approachen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn611199769en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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