Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30598 
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dc.contributor.authorDjajić, Slobodanen
dc.contributor.authorMichael, Michael S.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-22-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:23:03Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:23:03Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30598-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the interaction between migration policies of the host and source countries in the context of a model of guest-worker migration. For the host, the objective is to provide low-cost labor for its employers while avoiding illegal immigration. It optimizes over these objectives by setting the time limit of a guest-worker permit. The source country seeks remittance flows and return migration by offering fiscal benefits to returnees. Within this framework, we solve for the Nash equilibrium values of the migration policy instruments and compare them with the ones that emerge in a cooperative setting.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2811en
dc.subject.jelF22en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordtemporary migrationen
dc.subject.keywordremittancesen
dc.subject.keywordmigration policyen
dc.subject.stwInternationale Arbeitsmobilitäten
dc.subject.stwSaisonarbeitskräfteen
dc.subject.stwMigrationspolitiken
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleTemporary migration policies and welfare of the host and source countries : a game-theoretic approach-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn611199769en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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