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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2653
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
The pay-as-you-go social security system, which suffers from dwindling labor force, can benefit from immigrants with birth rates that exceed the native-born birth rates in the host country. Thus, a social security system provides effectively an incentive to liberalize migration policy. The paper examines a political- economy, inter-generational, mechanism through which the social security system influences voter attitudes in favor of more liberal immigration regime. We demonstrate that the Markov equilibrium, with social security, consists of more liberal migration policies, than the corresponding Markov equilibrium with no social security.
JEL: 
F22
H55
J11
P16
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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