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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2884
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Using the aggregative game approach as developed by Cornes and Hartley (2003, 2007) this paper analyzes the conditions under which matching mechanisms in a public good economy lead to interior matching equilibria in which all agents make strictly positive flat contributions to the public good. In particular we show that the distribution of income among the agents is a crucial determinant for the existence of interior matching equilibria. In addition, we explore which matching mechanisms show Warr neutrality and how the size of the economy affects the possibility of implementing a certain type of Pareto optimal solutions through matching.
JEL: 
H41
H77
Q54
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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