Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30586
Authors: 
Buchholz, Wolfgang
Cornes, Richard
Rübbelke, Dirk T. G.
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 2884
Abstract: 
Using the aggregative game approach as developed by Cornes and Hartley (2003, 2007) this paper analyzes the conditions under which matching mechanisms in a public good economy lead to interior matching equilibria in which all agents make strictly positive flat contributions to the public good. In particular we show that the distribution of income among the agents is a crucial determinant for the existence of interior matching equilibria. In addition, we explore which matching mechanisms show Warr neutrality and how the size of the economy affects the possibility of implementing a certain type of Pareto optimal solutions through matching.
JEL: 
H41
H77
Q54
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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