Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30581
Authors: 
Golombek, Rolf
Hoel, Michael
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 2677
Abstract: 
We examine international cooperation on technological development as a supplement to, or an alternative to, international cooperation on emission reductions. R&D should be increased beyond the non-cooperative level if (i) the technology level in one country is positively affected by R&D in other countries, (ii) the domestic carbon tax is lower than the Pigovian level, or (iii) the domestic carbon tax is set directly through an international tax agreement. A second-best technology agreement has higher R&D, higher emissions, or both compared with the first-best-outcome. The second-best subsidy always exceeds the subsidy under no international R&D cooperation. Further, when the price of carbon is the same in the second-best technology agreement and in the case without R&D cooperation, welfare is highest, R&D is highest and emissions are lowest in the second-best R&D agreement.
Subjects: 
climate policy
international climate agreements
R&D policy
technology spillovers
JEL: 
H23
O30
Q20
Q38
Q48
Q54
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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