Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/305800 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2022
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Dynamic Games and Applications [ISSN:] 2153-0793 [Volume:] 13 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 462-479
Verlag: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a hedonic coalition formation game in which a coalition chooses for each partition of the player set the probability with which it forms and thereby destroys the current partition. These probabilities are commonly known so that farsighted players know at every partition what future partitions, and hence payoffs, will be reached with what probability. Thus, players can make rational decisions about the moves they support. We show that if coalitions make mistakes with small but positive probability, then there is a behavior profile in which no coalition has a profitable one-shot deviation.
Schlagwörter: 
Abstract games
Hedonic games
Farsighted stability
Coalition stable equilibrium
JEL: 
C71
C72
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

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