Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30577 
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dc.contributor.authorGersbach, Hansen
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-17-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:22:47Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:22:47Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30577-
dc.description.abstractWe present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the platform choices of candidates would exist. Our game with financing of political campaigns exhibits two equilibria, depending on whether a majority of interest groups runs to support the leftist or rightist candidate. The equilibria generate a variety of new features of campaign games and may help identify the objective functions of candidates empirically.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2834en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordelectionsen
dc.subject.keywordcampaign contributionsen
dc.subject.keywordinterest groupsen
dc.subject.stwWahlkampfen
dc.subject.stwWahlkampffinanzierungen
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleCampaigns, political mobility, and communication-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn612915689en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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