Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/305757 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 17315
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We experimentally investigate how players with opposing views compete for influence through strategic targeting in networks. We varied the network structure, the relative influence of the opponent, and the heterogeneity of the nodes' initial opinions. Although most players adopted a best-response strategy based on their relative influence, we also observed behaviors deviating from this strategy, such as the tendency to target central nodes and avoid nodes targeted by the opponent. Targeting is also affected by affinity and opposition biases, the strength of which depends on the distribution of initial opinions.
Subjects: 
network
influence
targeting
competition
laboratory experiment
JEL: 
C91
D85
D91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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