Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/305757 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 17315
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We experimentally investigate how players with opposing views compete for influence through strategic targeting in networks. We varied the network structure, the relative influence of the opponent, and the heterogeneity of the nodes' initial opinions. Although most players adopted a best-response strategy based on their relative influence, we also observed behaviors deviating from this strategy, such as the tendency to target central nodes and avoid nodes targeted by the opponent. Targeting is also affected by affinity and opposition biases, the strength of which depends on the distribution of initial opinions.
Schlagwörter: 
network
influence
targeting
competition
laboratory experiment
JEL: 
C91
D85
D91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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