Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/305729 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 17287
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Incentives are supposed to increase effort, yet individuals react differently to incentives. We examine this heterogeneity by investigating how personal characteristics, preferences, and socio-economic background relate to incentives and performance in a real effort task. We analyze the performance of 1,933 high-school students under a Fixed, Variable, or Tournament payment. Productivity and beliefs about relative performance, but hardly any personal characteristics, play a decisive role for performance when payment schemes are exogenously imposed. Only when given the choice to select the payment scheme, personality traits, economic preferences and socioeconomic background matter. Algorithmic assignment of payment schemes could improve performance, earnings, and utility, as we show.
Schlagwörter: 
effort
productivity
incentives
personality traits
preferences
socio-economic background
ability
heterogeneity
sorting
algorithm
lab-in-the-field experiment
JEL: 
C93
D91
J24
J41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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