Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/305685 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 17243
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
We analyze the effect of CEO pay disclosure on wage distribution by exploiting a 1998 reform requiring Italian publicly listed companies to disclose top executives' compensation. In firms where CEOs disclose high total compensation, the top 5 percent and 1 percent of the within-firm wage distribution rise substantially. Instead, the effect on average wages is small and only marginally significant. As a result, wage inequality increases. These effects are stronger for workers with low experience or located in the main region of the firm's operations. Moreover, they are driven by changes in workers' bargaining power, rather than by sorting.
Subjects: 
CEO compensation
wage disclosure
income inequality
wage bargaining
JEL: 
J31
D63
D9
M12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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