Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/305679 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 17237
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a model of college major selection in an environment where firms and students have incomplete information about the student's aptitude. Students must choose from a continuum of majors which differ in their human capital production function and can act as a signal to the market. Whether black students choose more or less difficult majors than similar white students, and whether they receive a higher or lower return to major difficulty, depends on the extent to which employers statistically discriminate. We find strong evidence that statistical discrimination influences major choice using administrative data from several large universities and two nationally representative surveys.
Schlagwörter: 
mismatch
affirmative action
statistical discrimination
JEL: 
J71
J15
I26
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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