Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/305662 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 17220
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Rational parties enter into a contract if the agreement is mutually beneficial. However, after the contract is formed, changes to the costs and/or benefits of performance may render the original contract undesirable. In this paper, we carry out an incentivized experiment to study the effect of alternative remedies on the parties' ability to renegotiate their contractual obligations. After entering into a contract, experimental subjects observe symmetrical changes to the original costs and/or benefits, which create a misalignment of their performance vs. breach incentives. Renegotiation of the original contract would allow parties to realign their interests and to capture some additional surplus. Our experimental design compares the effects of damage and specific performance remedies on the parties' ability to renegotiate. Our results confirm Coase' (1960) irrelevance of remedies proposition, providing novel insights for the choice of contract remedies in the face of possible market shocks.
Schlagwörter: 
efficient breach
contract remedies
specific performance
damages
JEL: 
K12
K41
C90
D86
D91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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