Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/305509 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11267
Publisher: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
Calls to boycott a foreign country aim to push a share of domestic consumers to cut their consumption of goods imported from the targeted country. How do boycotts differ from sanctions? Should boycotters target all of the country’s products, or should they focus on a restricted set of sectors? I answer these questions in a canonical Ricardian model. The model allows me to determine the optimal targeted boycott strategies and trace out the Pareto frontier of the domestic boycotters’ and foreign country’s welfare.
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.