Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/305507 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11265
Verlag: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
When a counter-proposal is made to an initiative to change the Swiss constitution, the citizenry makes three binary majority choices: the initiative versus the status quo, the initiative versus the counter-proposal, and the status quo versus the counterproposal as a tie-breaker. If there is a cycle, the alternative that beats the status-quo wins. This system invites strategic voting, as exemplified by the 2010 case of the “Ausschaffungsinitiative”. We suggest to break cycles differently by choosing the middle alternative in case of a cycle, which will normally be the counter-proposal. More precisely, we show that there always exists a strong Nash equilibrium in which all citizens vote sincerely. Moreover, the outcome of all alternative strong equilibria with strategic voting is the same as if everybody votes sincerely. We also show that other common cycle-breaker rules cannot achieve the same result.
Schlagwörter: 
Swiss democracy
three-way referendum
Condorcet Winner
manipulation
information sharing
initiative
JEL: 
C72
D70
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.