Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/305475 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Staff Reports No. 1123
Verlag: 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
What are the effects of payout restrictions on bank risk-shifting? To answer this question, we exploit the restriction policies imposed during the Covid-crisis on US banks as a natural experiment. Using a highfrequency differences-in-differences empirical strategy, we show that, when share buybacks are banned and dividends restricted, banks' equity prices fall while their CDS spreads and bond yields decline. These results indicate that payout restrictions shift risk from debtholders into equityholders. Consistent with a risk-shifting channel, we find that these effects revert once restrictions are lifted. Moreover, banks that are ex-ante more reliant on share buybacks than dividends in their payout policies, decrease risk-taking relative to banks that are ex ante more dividends reliant, with those effects reverting when the restrictions are relaxed. These results indicate that payout and risk-taking choices are complementary and that regulatory payout restrictions endogenously affect bank risk-shifting incentives.
Schlagwörter: 
banking
payout restrictions
risk-shifting
prudential regulation
JEL: 
G21
G28
G35
G38
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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