Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/305473 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Staff Reports No. 1121
Verlag: 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
Trades in today's financial system are inherently subject to settlement uncertainty. This paper explores tokenization as a potential technological solution. A token system, by enabling programmability of assets, can be designed to eradicate settlement uncertainty. We study the allocations achieved in a decentralized market with either the legacy settlement system or a token system. Tokenization can improve efficiency in markets subject to a limited commitment problem. However, it also materially alters the information environment, which in turn aggravates a hold-up problem. This limits potential gains from resolving settlement uncertainty, particularly for markets that depend on intermediaries. We show that optimal design hinges on joint design of settlement and trading systems, and in particular, that token systems work best when matched with direct trading.
Schlagwörter: 
tokenization
programmability
settlement uncertainty
asymmetric information
JEL: 
D82
D86
D47
G29
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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