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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2737
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper generalizes the frequently used Hotelling model for two-sided markets in order to determine the equilibrium market shares. We show that advertisement levels depend neither on the media price nor on the location of the media firm. An increase in advertising revenues does not change location but only the media price. If the distribution of consumers is asymmetric, market shares will be asymmetric as well, and the media firm with the larger market share charges the higher media price. The larger firm makes a higher profit per reader and in aggregate compared to its smaller rival.
Schlagwörter: 
Hotelling
general density function
media
location
JEL: 
D43
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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