Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30525
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dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarleen_US
dc.contributor.authorStähler, Franken_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-02en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:20:36Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:20:36Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30525-
dc.description.abstractThis paper generalizes the frequently used Hotelling model for two-sided markets in order to determine the equilibrium market shares. We show that advertisement levels depend neither on the media price nor on the location of the media firm. An increase in advertising revenues does not change location but only the media price. If the distribution of consumers is asymmetric, market shares will be asymmetric as well, and the media firm with the larger market share charges the higher media price. The larger firm makes a higher profit per reader and in aggregate compared to its smaller rival.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2737en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordHotellingen_US
dc.subject.keywordgeneral density functionen_US
dc.subject.keywordmediaen_US
dc.subject.keywordlocationen_US
dc.subject.stwMedienökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwOligopolen_US
dc.subject.stwMarktstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwMarktanteilen_US
dc.subject.stwHotelling Modellen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleMarket shares in two-sided media industriesen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn608011185en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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