Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30523
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dc.contributor.authorWagener, Andreasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-01en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:20:35Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:20:35Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30523-
dc.description.abstractRather than about absolute payoffs, governments in fiscal competition often seem to care about their performance relative to other governments. Moreover, they often appear to mimic policies observed elsewhere. We study such behaviour in a tax competition game with mobile capital à la Zodrow-Mieszkowski. Both with relative payoff concerns and for imitative policies, evolutionary stability is the appropriate solution concept. It renders tax competition more aggressive than with best-reply policies (Nash equilibrium). Whatever the number of jurisdictions involved, an evolutionary stable tax policy coincides with the competitive outcome of a tax competition game played among infinitely many governments. Tax competition among boundedly rational governments, thus, involves drastic efficiency losses.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x2723en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.jelH75en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordrelative performanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordtax mimickingen_US
dc.subject.keywordevolutionary stabilityen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwImitationswettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwBeschränkte Rationalitäten_US
dc.subject.stwEvolutionäre Spieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleTax competition, relative performance and policy imitationen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn607959622en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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